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We consider a basic resource allocation game, where the players’ strategy spaces are sub-
sets of Rm and cost/utility functions are parameterized by some common vector u ∈ Rm
and, otherwise, only depend on the own strategy choice. A strategy of a player can be in-
terpreted as a vector of resource consumption and a joint strategy profile naturally leads to
an aggregate consumption vector. Resources can be priced, that is, the game is augmented
by a price vector λ ∈ Rm+ and players have quasi-linear overall costs/utilities meaning that
in addition to the original costs/utilities, a player needs to pay the corresponding price per
consumed unit. We investigate the following question: for which aggregated consumption
vectors u can we find prices λ that induce an equilibrium realizing the targeted consump-
tion profile?
For answering this question, we develop a duality-based framework and derive a char-
acterization of the existence of such u and λ. We show that our characterization can
help to unify parts of three largely independent streams in the literature – tolls in trans-
portation systems, Walrasian market equilibria and congestion control in communication
networks. Besides reproving existing results we establish novel existence results by drawing
connections to polyhedral combinatorics and discrete convexity.
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1 Introduction
Resource allocation problems play a key role in our society. Whenever available resources need to be
matched to demands, the goal is to find the most profitable or least costly allocation of the resources.
Applications can be found in several areas, including traffic networks ([7, 49, 63, 69, 77]), telecommu-
nication networks ([45, 70]), and economics ([53, 55, 75]). In most of the above applications, a finite
(or infinite) number of players interact strategically, each optimizing their individual objective func-
tion. The corresponding allocation of resources in such setting is usually determined by an equilibrium
solution of the underlying strategic game.
A central question in all these areas concerns the problem of how to incentivize players in order to
use the (scarce) resources optimally. One key approach in all named application areas is the concept
of pricing resources according to their usage. Every resource comes with an anonymous prices per
unit of consumption and defining the “right” prices thus offers the chance of inducing equilibria with
optimal or efficient resource usage. Prominent examples are toll pricing in transportation networks
(see, e.g., [8, 13, 31, 27, 78]), congestion pricing in telecommunication networks (cf. [51, 45, 70]) and
market pricing or combinatorial auctions in economics (cf. [39, 47, 53]). A prime example of the
latter, is the Walrasian competitive equilibrium (cf. Walras [75]), where goods are priced such that
there is an allocation of goods to buyers with the property that every buyer gets a bundle of items
maximizing her overall utility given the current prices for the goods.
In this paper, we will introduce a generic model of pricing in resource allocation games that subsumes
several of the above mentioned applications as a special case. In the following, we first introduce the
model formally, discuss applications and then give an overview on the main results and related work.
1.1 The Model
Let E = {1, . . . ,m} be a finite and non-empty set of resources and N = {1, . . . ,n} be a nonempty
finite set of players. For i ∈ N , let Xi ⊂ Rm,Xi , ∅ denote the strategy space of player i and define
X :=

Xi as the combined strategy space. In the following, vectors xi = (xij)j∈E ∈Xi are denoted
in bold face. The entry xij can be interpreted as the level of resource consumption of player i for
resource j. For the moment, we do not require non-negativity of the entries of xi. Let x = (xij) ∈ Rn·m
denote the vector of resource consumption of all players that we also call a strategy distribution. For
a strategy distribution x, we define the load on resource j ∈ E as `j(x) :=∑i∈N xij .
In the following, we introduce properties of utility functions needed for our main results. We
will distinguish between cost minimization games and utility maximization games and start with the
former.
Assumption 1.1. We assume that cost/utility functions are parameterized by an exogenously given
vector u ∈ Rm and depend on the own strategy vector only.
1. For minimization games Gmin(u) with respect to u ∈ Rm, the total cost of a player i ∈N under
strategy distribution x ∈X is defined by a function costi :X → R, which satisfies
costi(x) := pii(u,xi) for all x ∈X for some function pii : Rm×Xi→ R.
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2. For maximization games Gmax(u), we denote the utility function for i ∈ N by utilityi : X → R
and we assume that it satisfies
utilityi(x) := vi(u,xi) for all x ∈X for some function vi : Rm×Xi→ R.
The vector u can be interpreted as the induced load of an equilibrium, that is, u = `(x). We
assume for the moment that players are load taking in the sense that they assume not being able to
influence the global load vector u by their own strategy xi, thus leading to the prescribed shape of
the cost/utility functions – we will later also consider models in which a functional dependency of the
strategy choice on the induced load is allowed.
1.2 Pricing in Resource Allocation Games
We are concerned with the problem of defining prices λj ≥ 0, j ∈ E on the resources in order to
incentivize an efficient usage of the resources as explained below. If player i uses resource j at level xij ,
she needs to pay λjxij . The quantities pii(u,xi) and λjxij are assumed to be normalized to represent
the same unit (say money in Euro) and, thus, the private cost function becomes pii(u,xi)+λᵀxi. If the
parameter u = (uj)j∈E ∈ Rm represents a targeted load vector `(x∗), then, the task is to find prices
λ ∈ Rm+ so that x∗ becomes an equilibrium of the game with prices.
Definition 1.2 (Enforceability). A vector u ∈ Rm is enforceable by prices λ ∈ Rm+ , if there is x∗ ∈ X
satisfying 1. and 2. for minimization games Gmin(u) or 1. and 3. for maximization games Gmax(u):
1. `j(x∗) = uj for all j ∈ E.
2. Minimization: x∗i ∈ argminxi∈Xi {pii(u,xi) +λᵀxi} for all i ∈N.
3. Maximization: x∗i ∈ argmaxxi∈Xi {vi(u,xi)−λᵀxi} for all i ∈N.
If a tuple (x∗,λ) satisfies the above conditions except that Condition 1. only holds with inequality,
that is, `(x∗)≤ u, we say that u ∈ Rm is weakly enforced by (x∗,λ).
Condition 1. requires that x∗ realizes the capacities `(x∗) = u while Condition 2. implements x∗
as a pure Nash equilibrium of the minimization game Gmin(u) augmented with prices. Condition 1.
and 3. refer to a maximization game Gmax(u) augmented with prices.
1.3 Running Examples
We give three prototypical examples that are used throughout the paper.
Example 1.3 (Tolls in Network Routing). There is a directed graph G = (V,E) and a finite set N of
populations of commuters modeled by tuples (si, ti,di), i ∈ N , where si is the source, ti the sink and
di > 0 represents the volume of flow that is traveling from si to ti. In this setting, we can think of the
set E as being the set of resources and Xi representing a flow polytope for every population i ∈ N .
In the network routing literature, there are several equilibrium notions known according to whether
the underlying model is nonatomic (Wardrop equilibrium) or atomic (Nash equilibrium). Given an
equilibrium concept, the goal is to find network tolls λj ≥ 0, j ∈ E on edges that enforce a prescribed
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strategy distribution (overall flow) as an equilibrium, see [8, 27, 31, 78] for just a few works in the
transportation and computer science literature. One important aspect of these two different models
is that in the atomic model, the set of flows Xi carries integrality requirements while the non-atomic
formulation usually involves convex sets Xi. Let us emphasize that most models in the area of network
routing assume that the cost of a player (or an agent) only depends on the own strategy choice and the
aggregate load vector induced by the strategies of the competitors. Moreover for nonatomic models,
an agent cannot influence the load vector by her own strategy choice. In this regard, only nonatomic
games seem to fit into the class of games Gmin(u) augmented with prices introduced in Assumption 1.1.
But as we will see later, also atomic congestion games can be handled.
Now we turn to the area of Walrasian market equilibria which constitutes a central topic in the
economics literature, see the original work of Walras [75] and later landmark papers of Kelso and
Crawford [47], Gul and Stachetti [39] and Danilov et al. [25].
Example 1.4 (Market Equilibria). Suppose there are items E = {1, . . . ,m} for sale and there is a set
N = {1, . . . ,n} of buyers interested in buying some of the items. For every subset S ⊆ E of items,
player i experiences value vi(S) ∈ R giving rise to a valuation function vi : 2m→ R, i ∈ N, where 2m
represents the set of all subsets of E. The market manager wants to determine a price vector λ ∈ Rm+
so that all items are sold to the players and every player demands a subset Si ⊆ E maximizing her
quasi-linear utility: Si ∈ argmaxS⊆E{wi(S)−
∑
j∈S λj}. This is known as a Walrasian competitive
equilibrium.
This class of games also belongs to the class Gmax(u) augmented with prices introduced in Assump-
tion 1.1, because the valuation function of a buyer only depends on her own assigned bundle of items.
If Xi, i ∈ N represents the set of incidence vectors of subsets of E, we can set u = (1, . . . ,1)ᵀ ∈ Rm
and any pair x ∈X,λ ∈ Rm+ that enforces u corresponds to a competitive equilibrium. Several further
variants are known in the literature according to whether items are divisible or not and if allocations
of items need to satisfy further combinatorial or algebraical constraints. As we will show later, the
introduced framework allows several generalizations, such as letting the valuation function also depend
on the aggregated vector of allocations of other players.
The next application resides in the area of congestion control in communication networks and
exhibits joint elements of the two previous models: the model is a maximization game but the strategy
space carries a network structure as in transportation systems.
Example 1.5 (Congestion Control in Communication Networks). We consider a model of Kelly et
al. [45] in the domain of TCP-based congestion control. We are given a directed or undirected ca-
pacitated graph G = (V,E,c), where V are the nodes, E the edge set and c ∈ Rm+ denotes the edge
capacities. There is a set of players N = {1, . . . ,n} and each i ∈N is associated with an end-to-end pair
(si, ti) ∈ V ×V and a non-decreasing and concave bandwidth utility function Ui : R+→ R+ measuring
the received benefit from sending net flow from si to ti. The strategy space Xi of a player represents
a flow polyhedron and for a flow xi ∈ Xi with value val(xi) the received bandwidth utility is equal
to Ui(val(xi)). The goal in this setting is to determine a price vector λ ∈ Rm+ so that a strategy
distribution x∗ is induced as an equilibrium respecting the network capacities c and, hence, avoids
congestion. The equilibrium condition is given by
x∗i ∈ argmax{Ui(val(xi))−λᵀxi|xi ∈Xi} for all i ∈N .
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This model fits to the class Gmax(u) augmented with prices: The utility function of a player only
depends on the own action and with u := c we obtain the desired structure. For maximization problems
over network flows, it is clear that in a capacitated graph only bottleneck edges are saturated, thus,
the goal is to determine a price vector λ ∈ Rm+ so that the network capacities are weakly enforced.
1.4 Overview of Results and Organization of the Paper
In Section 1.1 and 1.2, we introduced a resource allocation model and motivated the question of
enforceability of load vectors induced by equilibrium profiles with respect to anonymous resource prices.
In Section 2, we will develop a duality-based framework and our first main result (Theorem 2.3) states
that a load vector u is enforceable by prices λ if and only if an associated optimization problem has
zero duality gap and there is an optimal solution satisfying an inequality with equality. In Section 2.3
we strengthen this result by allowing to consider extended formulations and in Section 2.4 we discuss
implications for secondary optimization problems over the price/allocation space enforcing a load
vector.
The strength of these results is that they impose virtually no assumptions on the structure of feasible
strategy sets nor on the utility/cost functions except for their special structure and the conditions on
the duality gap. In the application domains of traffic networks, markets and congestion control, many
existence results of enforcing prices are also based on duality arguments but most of these results are
tailored to their specific setting. We see our model as a first step towards a unifying approach.
Using the main characterization as a blue print, we then consider in Section 3 the case of integrality
conditions of strategy spaces. It follows that for problems admitting a fractional relaxation with zero
duality gap and integer optimal solutions, the sufficiency condition of Theorem 2.3 is satisfied. For
polyhedral integral strategy spaces, the powerful methods from polyhedral combinatorics can be used
to categorize cases for which such relaxations exist. In this regard, we show two prototypical results:
1. Theorem 3.7 gives an enforceability result for games with homogenous linear utilities/costs and
(box) totally-dual-integral and decomposable aggregation polytopes.
2. Theorem 3.8 gives an enforceability result for games with player-specific linear utilities/costs on
polymatroidal strategy spaces.
With these results and methods at hand, we apply the framework to the three application domains.
Tolls in traffic networks. In Section 4, we consider the problem of defining tolls in order to enforce
certain load vectors as Wardrop equilibrium. For nonatomic network games, we reprove and generalize
in Theorem 4.2 a characterization of enforceable load vectors by Yang and Huang [78], Fleischer et
al. [31] and Karakostas and Kolliopoulos [44].
Then we turn to atomic congestion games. For general nondecreasing homogeneous cost functions,
we show that polytopal congestion games can be analyzed using Theorem 3.7. It turns out that for
a wide classes of congestion games (matroid games, single-source network games, r-arborescences,
matching games, and more) the defining aggregation polytope is box-integral and decomposable lead-
ing to existence results of enforcing tolls (Theorem 4.5). For all these settings, a congestion vector
u minimizing the social cost can be computed in polynomial time (see Del Pia et al. [61] and Kleer
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and Schäfer [48]) and the space of enforcing prices can be described by a compact linear formula-
tion. It follows that for a fixed enforceable capacity vector u, arbitrary linear objective functions (like
maximum or minimum revenue) can be efficiently optimized over the price/allocation space. Besides
single-source network games (see Fotakis and Spirakis [34] and Fotakis et al. [33]), these results were
not known before.
Then, we study the more challenging case of atomic congestion games with nondecreasing player-
specific cost functions on the resources. We prove – using our result on polymatroids – that for
polymatroidal strategy spaces, one can obtain existence results (Theorem 4.6). To the best of our
knowledge, these are the first existence results of tolls for congestion games with player-specific cost
functions. We complement this result by showing in Theorem 4.7 that already the case of homogenous
cost functions with heterogeneous players is considerably harder than the purely homogenous case:
even for symmetric s,t network games the corresponding (compact) LP-relaxation cannot be integral
(unless P =NP ).
Market equilibria. In Section 5, we study (indivisible) single and multi-item markets and show that
the existence of Walrasian equilibria can be studied within the framework. We reprove with two
different proofs a classical existence result of equilibria for gross-substitute valuations. One proof is
based on the methods of discrete convexity and M -convexity (see Murota [56]) while the other uses
LP-duality. Both proofs are known in the literature but we embed them here under the same roof.
Then we consider a class of valuations for multi-unit items that we term separable additive valuations
with negative externalities. The idea is that items are of different type but may be sold at a certain
multiplicity and the values for received items are additive. The precise item values may depend on
the allocation vector. This dependency is assumed to model negative externalities, that is, - roughly
speaking - if an item type is sold to more players, the value goes down. For this class of valuations,
we prove in Theorem 5.6 that for general polymatroidal environments, Walrasian equilibria exist. We
also study homogeneous separable additive valuations with externalities, where the value of every
player i for an item of type j under allocation vector x is equal and given by a nonincreasing function
of the number of sold items. In Theorem 5.7, we obtain similar existence results as for atomic
congestion games, e.g., for single-source network games, r-arborescences and matching games, there
exist Walrasian equilibria.
Congestion control in communication networks. In the final Section 6, we consider congestion
control problems in communication networks using a flow-based model proposed by Kelly et al. [45].
We first reprove an existence result of enforceable capacity vectors of Kelly et al. [45]. Then, we turn
to the much less explored model of integral flows, where a discrete unit-packet size is given. With
the machinery of polyhedral combinatorics, we prove that for single-source networks with identical
linearly increasing bandwidth utility functions, every nonnegative capacity vector is weakly enforceable
(Theorem 6.2).
1.5 Related Work
As outlined in the introduction, the topic of pricing resources concerns different streams of literature
and it seems impossible to give a complete overview here. The idea of using Lagrangian multipliers is as
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old as optimization itself and their use in terms of shadow prices measuring the change of the optimal
value function for marginally increased right-hand sides is well-known – assuming some constraint
qualification conditions, see for instance Boyd and Vandenberghe [15].
Our first main result (Theorem 2.3) relies on a decomposition property of the Lagrangian (for
separable problems) and the use of Lagrange multipliers for pricing the resources. This approach is
not new and has been developed before, see for instance Bertsekas and Ghallager [9] and Palomar
and Chiang [60]. In particular, motivated by the dual-decomposition of the convex programming
formulation of the bandwidth allocation problem of Kelly et al. [45], Palomar and Chiang [60] described
how the Lagrangian of a general separable optimization problem
max
{∑
i∈N
Ui(xi)|xi ∈Xi, i ∈N,
∑
i∈N
hi(xi)≤ u
}
can be decomposed into n independent problems. The difference of this model to ours is the parame-
terization of the cost/utility functions pii(u,xi) with respect to the capacity vector u. This degree of
freedom is a strict generalization and allows to model dependencies of targeted capacity vectors with
respect to the intrinsic cost/utilities - a prime example appears in nonatomic congestion games, where
the cost function of an agent only depends on the aggregated load vector. Moreover, this dependency
allows to model externalities with respect to allocations which are not possible in the model of Palomar
and Chiang [60].
In the following, the related work is organized according to the three application areas: tolls in
traffic networks, market equilibria and congestion control in communications.
Tolls in Traffic Networks. A large body of work in the area of transportation networks is concerned
with congestion toll pricing, see for example Knight [49], Beckmann et al. [7], Smith [69], and Hearn
et al. [43]. Beckmann et al. [7] showed that for the Wardrop model with homogeneous users, charging
the difference between the marginal cost and the real cost in the socially optimal solution (marginal
cost pricing) leads to an equilibrium flow which is optimal. Cole et al. [20] considered the case of
heterogeneous users, that is, users value latency relative to monetary cost differently. For single-
commodity networks, the authors showed the existence of tolls that induce an optimal flow as Nash
flow. Yang and Huang [78], Fleischer et al. [31] and Karakostas and Kolliopoulos [44] proved that
there are tolls inducing an optimal flow for heterogenous users even in general networks - all proofs
are based on linear programming duality. Swamy [72] and Yang and Zhang [79] proved the existence
of optimal tolls for the atomic splittable model using convex programming duality.
For atomic (unsplittable) network congestion games much less is known regarding the existence of
tolls. Caragiannis et al. [19] studied the existence of tolls for singleton congestion games. Fotakis and
Spirakis [34] proved the existence of tolls inducing any acyclic integral flow for symmetric s,t network
games with homogeneous players. Fotakis et al. [33] further extended this result to heterogeneous
players and networks with a common source but different sinks. Marden et al. [52] transferred the
idea of charging marginal cost tolls to congestion games and showed the existence of tolls enforcing
the load vector of a socially optimal strategy distribution.
Market Equilibria. Walrasian market equilibria constitute a central topic in economics. For the
problem of allocating indivisible single-unit items, there are several characterizations of the existence
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of equilibria related to the gross-substitute property of valuations, see Kelso and Crawford [47], Gul and
Stachetti [39] and Ausubel and Milgrom [4]. Several works established connections of the equilibrium
existence problem w.r.t. LP-duality and integrality (see Bikchandani and Mamer [12] and Shapley and
Shubik [66]). Murota and Tamura [57, 56] established connections between the gross substitutability
property and M-convexity properties of demand sets and valuations. Yokote [80] recently proved that
the existence of Walrasian equilibria follows from a duality property in discrete convexity.
For multi-unit items, several recent papers studied the existence of Walrasian equilibria. Danilov
et al. [25] investigated the existence of Walrasian equilibria in multi-unit auctions and identified
general conditions on the demand sets and valuations related to discrete convexity. The conditions
of Milgrom and Struluvici [54] and Ausubel [3] appear as special cases of those in [25]. Baldwin
and Klemperer [6] explored a connection with tropical geometry and gave necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of competitive equilibrium in product-mix auctions of indivisible goods.
This result is also closely related to the work of Danilov, Koshevoy, and Murota [25], see also Sun and
Yang [71]. Tran and Yu [73] gave a new proof of the sufficiency condition of [6] using a unimodularity
theorem in integer programming. For a comparison of the above works especially with respect to the
role of discrete convexity, we refer to the excellent survey of Shioura and Tamura [67]. Candogan et
al. [17, 18] showed that valuations classes (beyond GS valuations) based on graphical structures also
imply the existence of Walrasian equilibria. Their proof uses integrality of optimal solutions of an
associated linear min-cost flow formulation.
Our existence result for polymatroid environments differs to these previous works in the sense that we
allow valuations to depend on the allocation of items to other players (negative externalities). Much
fewer works allow for externalities in valuation functions, see for instance Zame and Noguchi [81].
Models with positive (network-based) externalities have been considered by Candogan et al. [16].
Bhattacharya et al. [10] considered a setting with weighted negative network-based externalities and
unit-demand buyers. Bikchandani et al. [11] consider a problem of selling a base of polymatroid.
In their model, however, the prices are not anonymous (rather VCG) for several items of the same
type. The same holds true for Goel et al. [38] who also consider polymatroids even with budget
constraints. Feldman et al. [30] proposed the notion of combinatorial Walrasian equilibria, where
items can be packed a priori into bundles. This ensures the existence of equilibria with approximately
optimal welfare guarantees. Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen [64] linked the equilibrium existence of
Walrasian equilibria with the computational complexity of the allocation and demand problems.
Congestion Control. Kelly et al. [45] proposed to model congestion control via analyzing optimal
solutions of a convex optimization problem, where an aggregated bandwidth utility subject to network
capacity constraints is maximized. By dualizing the problem and then decomposing terms (as we do
in this paper), it is shown that Lagrangian multipliers correspond to equilibrium enforcing congestion
prices. For an overview on more related work in this area, we refer to the book by Srikant [70].
Kelly and Vazirani [46] drew connections between market equilibrium computation and the congestion
control model of Kelly. Cominetti et al. [21] also studied the convex programming formulation of Kelly
et al. and established connections to the Wardrop equilibrium model. The most obvious difference
of these work to ours is that they assume convex strategy spaces and concave utility functions. Our
framework allows to add integrality conditions or non-convexities to the model.
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2 Connection to Duality Gaps in Optimization
In the following, we distinguish between cost minimization problems and utility maximization problems.
We explicitly prove our main results in the realm of cost minimization but all arguments carry directly
over to the maximization case. For later referral, we summarize the results for the maximization case
at the end of the section.
2.1 Cost Minimization Problems
To this end we define the following minimization problem:
min pi(x) (Pmin(u))
s.t.: `j(x)≤ uj , j ∈ E, (1)
xi ∈Xi, i= 1, . . . ,n,
where the objective function is defined as pi(x) :=∑i∈N pii(u,xi).
The Lagrangian function for problem Pmin(u) becomes
L(x,λ) := pi(x) +λᵀ(`(x)−u), λ ∈ Rm+ ,
and we can define the Lagrangian-dual as:
µ : Rm+ → R, µ(λ) = infx∈XL(x,λ) = infx∈X{pi(x) +λ
ᵀ(`(x)−u)}.
We assume that µ(λ) =−∞, if L(x,λ) is not bounded from below on X. The dual problem is defined
as:
sup
λ≥0
µ(λ) (Dmin(u))
Definition 2.1. Problem Pmin(u) has zero-duality gap, if there is λ∗ ∈ Rm+ and x∗ ∈X with pi(x∗) =
µ(λ∗). In this case, we say that the pair (x∗,λ∗) is primal-dual optimal.
Clearly, if problem Pmin(u) has zero-duality gap, the two solutions λ∗ ∈ Rm+ and x∗ ∈ X are
optimal for their respective problems Dmin(u) and Pmin(u) and infima/suprema in the definition of
µ become a minimum/maximum and the infimum in Pmin(u) becomes a minimum. We now show a
key structure, namely that the Lagrangian dual can be decomposed into n independent subproblems.
This decomposition step is similar to that of Palomar and Chiang [60], however, we use it for more
general cost/utility functions.
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Lemma 2.2. Let λ ∈ Rm+ . For a problem of type Pmin(u), the following holds true:
x∗ ∈ arg min
x∈X
L(x,λ)⇔ x∗i ∈ arg minxi∈Xi{pii(u,xi) +
m∑
j=1
λjxij} for all i ∈N. (2)
Proof. We calculate:
inf
x∈X
L(x,λ) = inf
xi∈Xi,i∈N
∑
i∈N
(pii(u,xi) +
m∑
j=1
λj(xij −uj))
= ∑
i∈N
inf
xi∈Xi
pii(u,xi) +
m∑
j=1
λj(xij −uj)
 ,
where the first equality follows by the linearity of `(x) and the last equality by the assumption
that pii(u,xi) only depends on xi ∈ Xi. Because taking the infimum is independent of the constant
−∑mj=1λjuj , the lemma follows.
We obtain the following result.
Theorem 2.3. A capacity vector u ∈ Rm is enforceable if and only if Pmin(u) has zero duality gap and
there is an optimal solution x∗ for Pmin(u) satisfying (1) with equality.
Proof. ⇐: By definition, zero duality gap implies that there are λ∗ ∈ Rm+ ,x∗ ∈X with
pi(x∗) = µ(λ∗) = min
x∈X
{pi(x) + (λ∗)ᵀ(`(x)−u)}
and both solutions are optimal for their respective problems. Since x∗ is primal feasible and satisfies (1)
with equality, we get x∗ ∈X and `(x∗) = u, thus, Condition 1. in Definition 1.2 is satisfied. It remains
to prove Condition 2. With x∗ ∈ argminx∈X L(x,λ∗) we get
x∗ ∈ arg min
x∈X
L(x,λ∗) ⇔
Lem. 2.2
x∗i ∈ arg minxi∈Xi{pii(u,xi) +
∑
j∈E
λ∗jxij} for all i ∈N.
⇒: Let u ∈ Rm be enforceable by some x∗ ∈X and λ∗ ∈ Rm+ , that is, (x∗,λ∗) satisfy `(x∗) = u and
x∗i ∈ argminxi∈Xi {pii(u,xi) + (λ∗)ᵀxi} for all i ∈N. We calculate
µ(λ∗) = inf
x∈X
{pi(x) + (λ∗)ᵀ(`(x)−u)}
= inf
x∈X
{
∑
i∈N
pii(u,xi) + (λ∗)ᵀxi}− (λ∗)ᵀu (3)
=
∑
i∈N
inf
xi∈Xi
{pii(u,xi) + (λ∗)ᵀxi}− (λ∗)ᵀu (4)
= pi(x∗) + (λ∗)ᵀ`(x∗)− (λ∗)ᵀu (5)
= pi(x∗), (6)
where (3) follows from the definition of pi(x) and the linearity of `(x), (4) follows because pii(u,xi)
only depends on xi, (5) uses that (x∗,λ∗) enforce u and (6) uses u = `(x∗). Hence, strong duality
holds for the pair (x∗,λ∗).
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It is remarkable that the above result does not rely on any assumption on the feasible sets Xi or on
the functions pii(u,xi), i ∈N as long as Pmin(u) has zero duality gap and admits an optimal solution
that fulfils (1) with equality. In the optimization literature, several classes of optimization problems
are known to have zero duality gap even without convexity of feasible sets and objective functions, see
for instance Zheng et al. [82].
For weak enforceability, we obtain the following straight-forward corollary.
Corollary 2.4. A capacity vector u ∈ Rm is weakly enforceable if Pmin(u) has zero duality gap.
In cost minimization games, the feasible sets Xi usually contain some sort of covering conditions
on the resource consumption. For example in network routing, one needs to send some prescribed
amount of flow. In this regard, we introduce a natural candidate set of vectors u for which we know
that any feasible solution satisfying (1) does so with equality.
Definition 2.5. A vector u ∈ Rm is called minimal for X, if
u ∈ arg min
u′∈Rm
∑
j∈E
hj(u′j)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∃x ∈X with `(x)≤ u
 ,
where hj : R→ R, j ∈ E are strictly increasing functions.
The above definition has been previously used by Fleischer et al. [31] in the context of enforcing
tolls in nonatomic congestion games.
Theorem 2.6. Let u ∈ Rm be minimal for X. Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
1. u is enforceable via price vector λ∗ ∈ Rm+ and x∗ ∈X.
2. (x∗,λ∗) satisfies pi(x∗) = µ(λ∗).
The only difference to Theorem 2.3 is that by minimality of u, we get `(x) = u for any feasible
solution of Pmin(u), therefore, tightness of inequality (1) is already satisfied.
Let us now consider the important special case of convex optimization problems.
Corollary 2.7. Let Xi, i ∈ N be nonempty convex sets and assume that pii(u,xi), i ∈ N are convex
functions over Xi. Let u ∈ Rm be minimal and suppose there exists x0 ∈ relint(X) ∩ {x|`(x) ≤ u},
where relint(X) denotes the relative topological interior of X. Then, u is enforceable.
Proof. For Pmin(u), we have a convex objective over non-empty convex sets Xi, i ∈ N intersected
by an affine half-space. Since Pmin(u) is feasible and Slater’s constrained qualification condition
(cf. Slater [68]) is satisfied we get that Pmin(u) has zero duality gap and the result follows from
Theorem 2.6.
The above result can also be interpreted as a special case of the second welfare theorem (which also
relies on convexity), see Arrow [2] and Debreu [26].
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2.2 Utility Maximization Problems
Now we turn to utility maximization problems and define the following analogous problem:
max {v(x)| `j(x)≤ uj , j ∈ E, xi ∈Xi, i= 1, . . . ,n} , (Pmax(u))
where the objective function is defined as
v(x) :=
∑
i∈N
vi(u,xi).
The Lagrangian function for problem Pmax(u) becomes
L(x,λ) := v(x)−λᵀ(`(x)−u), λ ∈ Rm+ ,
and we can define the Lagrangian-dual as:
µ : Rm+ → R
µ(λ) = sup
x∈X
L(x,λ) = sup
x∈X
{v(x)−λᵀ(`(x)−u)}.
We assume that µ(λ) =∞, if L(x,λ) is not bounded from above on X. The dual problem is defined
as:
inf
λ≥0
µ(λ) (Dmax(u))
We obtain the following analogous results to those of Section 2.1.
Theorem 2.8. Consider a problem of type Pmax(u). Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
1. A supply vector u ∈ Rm is enforceable.
2. Pmax(u) has zero duality gap and there is an optimal solution x∗ for Pmax(u) satisfying (1) with
equality.
Moreover, a supply vector u ∈ Rm is weakly enforceable, if Pmax(u) has zero duality gap.
In maximization games, the sets Xi usually contain some capacity restrictions, therefore the notion
of minimality of vectors u might not be appropriate. Take for instance the example of auctions in
Example 1.4. Here, u = 0 arises as the unique minimal u leading to trivial conclusions. Perhaps more
interesting are scenarios in which the combined valuation function v(x) is in some sense monotonically
non-decreasing on X.
Definition 2.9 (Upwards closure of X, Monotonicity of valuations). X is upwards-closed w.r.t. u ∈ Rm,
if `(x) ≤ u and `(x) , u for some x ∈ X implies that there is x′ ∈ X with x′ ≥ x and `(x′) = u. We
say that X is upwards-closed, if this property holds for all u ∈ Rm. The function v(x) is monotonically
non-decreasing on X, if v(x)≥ v(y) for all x,y ∈X with x≥ y.
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We obtain the following result regarding this monotonicity assumption.
Theorem 2.10. Assume that v(x) is monotonically non-decreasing and X is upwards closed w.r.t.
u ∈ Rm. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
1. The supply vector u ∈ Rm is enforceable.
2. Pmax(u) has zero duality gap.
Proof. By the monotonicity of v(x) and upwards-closedness of X w.r.t. u, any optimal solution
of Pmax(u) can be turned into one that satisfies (1) with equality.
We finally get an existence result for convex sets Xi, i ∈N and monotone and concave valuations.
Corollary 2.11. Let Xi, i ∈ N be nonempty convex sets so that X is upwards-closed w.r.t. u ∈ Rm.
Assume that vi, i ∈N are concave functions and v(x) is monotonically non-decreasing and that there
exist x0 ∈ relint(X)∩{x|`(x)≤ u}, Then, u is enforceable.
2.3 Extended Formulations
So far we assumed that for every player i ∈N , the strategy space lies in Rm, i.e., Xi ⊂ Rm. For some
applications, it makes sense to lift the strategy space into a higher-dimensional space by introducing
additional variables. The field of extended formulations considers the power of obtaining “better” such
formulations. Our model can easily incorporate such a lifting. For i ∈ N , we can allow for strategy
spaces Xi ⊂ Rm+ki for some ki ∈ N with the notation (xi,yi) ∈ Xi, where as before xi ∈ Rm and
additionally yi ∈ Rki . Moreover, we define X :=

i∈NXi. A cost/utility function gets now three
arguments pii : Rm×Rm×Rki → R, that is, it has the form pii(u,xi,yi) for all i ∈N.
It should be clear that the previous results directly carry over to the lifted version so we do not
repeat them here. In the main body of the paper, we mostly drop the lifting variable yi in order to
keep notation simple. Only when needed – see for instance Section 5.1 – we refer to the lifted variant.
2.4 Optimizing Over Enforceable Allocations and Prices
We briefly discuss here algorithmic consequences of Theorem 2.3. If a problem class satisfies the
sufficiency conditions of Theorem 2.3, one can optimize arbitrary real-valued functions V (λ,x) over
the allocation/price space enforcing a load vector u. Such an optimization problem looks as:
max (or min) {V (λ,x) | x ∈X, `(x) = u, pi(x)≤ µ(λ), λ≥ 0}. (OPT(λ,x))
In this formulation, the constraints ensure that any feasible solution (x,λ) is a pair of primal-dual
optimal solutions that satisfy `(x) = u as required in Theorem 2.3. If for instance the problems Pmin(u)
and Dmin(u) are polynomially-sized linear programs, and the objective V (λ,x) is linear (or convex),
we can efficiently solve OPT(λ,x). More generally, it suffices to have a polynomial separation oracle
for the linear system described by the combined primal-dual linear system. Relevant functions V (λ,x)
may be revenue functions or general social welfare functions. In the following Sections 4,5 and 6 we
describe such algorithmic results.
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3 Integral Resource Allocation Problems
Now we pay special attention to problems with integrality of feasible strategies. In many resource
allocation problems, feasible strategies are constrained to be integral – prime examples appear in con-
gestion games, where players select {0,1} vectors representing subsets of resources (within a collection
of allowable subsets) or combinatorial auctions, where players are interested in buying indivisible items
possibly satisfying further combinatorial properties.
Note that for Theorems 2.3 and 2.6 we did not assume any topological properties of the setsXi, i ∈N
a priori, except the conditions on the zero duality gap and the existence of a minimal u. In particular,
these results remain valid for integral sets Xi ⊂ Zm. However, due to their practical importance
and given that there is a large body of literature investigating duality gaps for integral optimization
problems, we analyze this special case in more detail. We assume in the following that the strategy
spaces of players i ∈N satisfy
Xi ⊆ Zm with X :=

i∈N
Xi.
The original problem Pmin(u) then becomes an optimization problem with integer constraints:
min {pi(x)| `j(x)≤ uj , j ∈ E, x ∈X ⊂ Zn·m} (IPmin(u))
We call the following optimization problem a convex fractional relaxation.
min {pi(x)| `j(x)≤ uj , j ∈ E, x ∈ R(X)} , (FRmin(u))
where R(X)⊂ Rn·m convex and has the property R(X)⊇X.
We obtain the following result.
Theorem 3.1. A capacity vector u ∈ Zm is enforceable by prices, if FRmin(u) has zero duality gap and
admits an integral optimal solution x∗ ∈X satisfying `(x∗) = u.
Proof. The proof follows the same lines as in Theorem 2.3. By definition, zero duality gap of FRmin(u)
implies that there are λ∗ ∈ Rm+ ,x∗ ∈ R(X) with
pi(x∗) = µ(λ∗) = min
x∈R(X)
{pi(x) +λ∗(`(x)−u)}
and both solutions are optimal for their respective problems. With x∗ ∈X and `(x∗) = u, Condition 1.
in Definition 1.2 is satisfied. It remains to prove Condition 2. As in the proof of Theorem 2.3, we get
x∗ ∈ argminx∈R(X)L(x,λ∗). But since X ⊆ R(X) and x∗ ∈X, we get x∗ ∈ argminx∈X L(x,λ∗). The
remaining steps are the same as in the proof of Theorem 2.3.
We directly get an associated result for minimal u ∈ Zm.
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Corollary 3.2. Let u ∈ Zm be minimal for X. Then, u is enforceable, if FRmin(u) has zero duality
gap and admits an integral optimal solution x∗ ∈X.
Note that the reverse direction in the above corollary does not hold, that is, the existence of an
enforceable integral vector u does not imply zero integrality gap of FRmin(u). Let us briefly restate
the corresponding main result for maximization games. For this, define the following problem.
max {v(x)| `j(x)≤ uj , j ∈ E, x ∈X ⊂ Zn·m} (IPmax(u))
Denote by FRmax(u) a fractional convex relaxation.
Theorem 3.3. A supply vector u ∈ Zm is enforceable by prices, if FRmax(u) has zero duality gap and
admits an integral optimal solution x∗ ∈X satisfying `(x∗) = u.
Corollary 3.4. Assume that v(x) is monotonically non-decreasing and X is upwards closed w.r.t. an
integral u ∈ Zm. Then, the supply vector u ∈ Zm is enforceable by prices, if FRmax(u) has zero duality
gap and admits an integral optimal solution x∗ ∈X
Corollaries 3.2 and 3.4 describe a clear path towards obtaining existence results for prices enforcing
certain capacity vectors u: we need to identify optimization problems of type FRmin(u) in real-
variables that admit integral optimal solutions. Assuming that Xi, i ∈ N are polyhedral and the
objectives are linear, this type of question is typically addressed in polyhedral combinatorics, see
Schrijver [65]. In this field, conditions like total-unimodularity or total-dual-integrality are important
concepts.
3.1 Polyhedral Games with Linear Objectives
In the following, we discuss this type of results and review some facts that are relevant here.
Definition 3.5. A polyhedron P ⊂ Rr is integral, if all its vertices are integral.
Let us now consider the case of binary {0,1} entries of vectors of feasible strategies. Suppose for
every i ∈N , the set Xi is of the form:
Xi = {xi ∈ {0,1}m|Aixi ≥ bi} ,
where Ai is a rational ki×m matrix and bi ∈Qki is a rational vector. Denote the combined set by
X := {x ∈ {0,1}n·m|Aixi ≥ bi, i ∈N} .
Assume further that the private cost function of a player is quasi-separable over the resources and
depends only on the aggregated load vector and the own load on the resource:
pii(u,xi) =
∑
j∈E
pii,j(u) ·xij ,
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where pii,j : Zm→ R denotes the player-specific per-unit cost on resource j mapping a vector u to the
reals. We use the term quasi-separability in order to emphasize that pii,j still depends on the entire load
vector u which is a global non-separable dependency. Let us now consider a minimal capacity vector
u ∈ Zm for X, that is, for any x ∈X with `(x)≤ u we have already `(x) = u. Then, problem IPmin(u)
can be reformulated as the following integer linear optimization problem (ILP):
min
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈E
pii,j(u)xij
∣∣∣∣∣∣ `j(x)≤ uj , j ∈ E, x ∈X
 (ILPmin(u))
Denote by LPmin(u) the fractional LP-relaxation of problem ILPmin(u), that is, we define
R(X) := {x ∈ [0,1]n·m|Aixi ≥ bi, i ∈N}
and then optimize over R(X)∩{x ∈ Rn·m|`(x)≤ u} instead of X ∩{x|`(x)≤ u}.
We obtain the following result.
Theorem 3.6. Let u ∈ Zm be minimal for X (see Definition 2.5). If R(X)∩ {x ∈ Rnm|`(x) ≤ u} is
non-empty and integral, then u is enforceable.
Proof. As u is minimal for X, we get that x ∈X∩{x|`(x)≤ u} implies `(x) = u. Using the integrality
of R(X)∩{x ∈ Rnm|`(x)≤ u} and the linearity of the objective function in ILPmin(u), there exists an
integral optimal solution x∗ ∈X of the relaxed problem LPmin(u). Since for LPmin(u) strong duality
holds, all conditions of Theorem 3.1 are satisfied and the result follows.
For the sake of brevity, we do not repeat corresponding results for maximization games.
3.2 Aggregation Polytopes and Total Dual Integrality
A powerful tool in polyhedral combinatorics is the notion of total-dual-integrality (TDI) of linear
systems (see Edmonds and Giles [29]). A rational system of the form Az ≥ b with A ∈ Qr×m and
b ∈ Qr is TDI, if for every integral c ∈ Zm, the dual of min{cᵀz|Ax ≥ b} given by max{zᵀb|Aᵀz =
c,z≥ 0} has an integral optimal solution (if the problem admits a finite optimal solution). It is known
that for TDI systems, the corresponding polyhedron is integral. A system Az ≥ b is box-TDI, if the
system Az ≥ b,` ≤ z ≤ u is TDI for all rational `,u. A polytope is called box-TDI, if it can be
described by a box-TDI system.
Now we return to problem ILPmin(u) and assume now that for all i ∈N , the matrices Ai are equal
to some matrix A ∈ Qr×m. We further assume that the cost functions are linear and homogenous,
that is, they have the form
pii(u,xi) =
∑
j∈E
pij(u) ·xij ,
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where pij : Zm → R denotes the resource-specific per-unit cost on resource j mapping a load vector
u to the reals. Instead of taking the Cartesian product of the LP-relaxations R(Xi), we define an
aggregation polytope:
PN = {z ∈ Rm|Az≥
∑
i∈N
bi,z≥ 0} (7)
This aggregated polytope seems only useful, if it is box-TDI and any solution z can be decomposed into
feasible strategies. This latter property is called the integer decomposition property (IDP). Formally,
PN has the IDP, if any integral optimal solution z ∈ PN can be decomposed into feasible integral
vectors, that is, z = ∑i∈N zi with zi ∈ Xi for all i ∈ N . We remark that Kleer and Schäfer [48]
showed - in a different context - that polytopal congestion games (see Section 4 for a definition) with
box-integral and IDP aggregation polytopes have nice properties in terms of equilibrium computation
and equilibrium welfare properties. Now we have everything together to state the following result.
Theorem 3.7. Let u be minimal for X. If PN is box-TDI and satisfies IDP, then for homogeneous
linear cost functions, problem LPmin(u) admits an integral optimal solution and, thus, u is enforceable.
Proof. Using the homogeneity of cost functions and the IDP assumption on PN , problem LPmin(u)
can be reformulated as
min
∑
j∈E
pij(u)yj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ y ∈ PN ∩{y|y≤ u}

As PN is box-TDI, there is an integral optimal solution which by IDP can be decomposed into the
original sets Xi, i ∈N .
3.3 Integral Polymatroid Games
We consider now a class of games based on polymatroids which rely on submodular functions defin-
ing structured capacity constraints on subsets of resources. An integral set function f : 2E → Z is
submodular if f(U) + f(V ) ≥ f(U ∪ V ) + f(U ∩ V ) for all U,V ∈ 2E ; f is monotone if f(U) ≤ f(V )
for all U ⊆ V ⊆ E; and f is normalized if f(∅) = 0. We call an integral, submodular, monotone,
and normalized function f : 2E → Z an integral polymatroid rank function. The associated integral
polyhedron is defined as
Pf :=
{
y ∈ Zm | y(U)≤ f(U) for all U ⊆ E
}
,
where for a vector y = (yj)j∈E and U ⊆ E, we write y(U) shorthand for
∑
j∈U yj . For an integral
polymatroid Pf , the corresponding integral polymatroid base polyhedron is defined as
Bf :=
{
y ∈ Zm | y(U)≤ f(U) for all U ⊆ E, y(E) = f(E)
}
.
We denote by
EBf :=
{
y ∈ Rm | y(U)≤ f(U) for all U ⊆ E, y(E) = f(E)
}
.
the relaxed polymatroid base polyhedron.
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Suppose there is a finite set N = {1, . . . ,n} of players so that each player i is associated with
an integral polymatroid rank function fi : 2E → Z that defines an integral polymatroid Pfi with
base polyhedron Bfi . A strategy of player i ∈ N is to choose a vector xi = (xi,j)j∈E ∈ Bfi , i.e.,
player i chooses an integral resource consumption xi,j ∈ Z for each resource e such that f(E) units
are distributed over the resources and for each U ⊆ E not more than fi(U) units are distributed over
the resources contained in U . Formally, the set Xi of feasible strategies of player i is defined as
Xi = Bfi =
{
xi ∈ Zm | xi(U)≤ fi(U) for all U ⊆ E, xi(E) = fi(E)
}
,
where, for a set U ⊆ E, we write xi(U) =∑j∈U xi,j . The Cartesian product X = X1×X2× ·· · ×Xn
of the players’ sets of feasible strategies is the joint strategy space.
Let us now restate problem ILPmin(u) in the context of polymatroids.
min
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈E
pii,j(u)xij (ILPmin−polymatroid(u))
xi ∈ Bfi , i ∈N
`j(x)≤ uj , j ∈ E (8)
Let us call LPmin−polymatroid(u) the fractional relaxation, where we optimize over EBfi , i ∈ N
instead of Bfi , i ∈N .
We will show in the following that LPmin−polymatroid(u) admits integral optimal solutions - by refor-
mulating ILPmin−polymatroid(u) as a polymatroid intersection problem whose underlying intersection
polytope is known to admit integral optimal solutions.1
We obtain the following result.
Theorem 3.8. Let u ∈ Zm be minimal for X. Then, LPmin−polymatroid(u) admits an integral optimal
solution satisfying (8) with equality and, thus, u is enforceable.
Before we prove the theorem, we state some observations. It is known that the fractional relaxation
of any individual integral polymatroid base polyhedron EBfi is box-integral – however this does not
imply that R(X)∩{x ∈ Rnm|`(x)≤ u} is also integral. Take for instance the path packing problem in
a capacitated graph, where one needs to find k disjoint paths for source-terminal pairs si,ti, i= 1, . . . ,k
in a digraph. For any individual si,ti pair, the flow polytope is integral and a feasible path can
be computed by shortest path computations. However, computing a path packing for multiple si,ti
pairs is strongly NP-hard and does not admit a polynomially sized integral LP formulation (unless
P =NP ).
Nevertheless, polymatroids carry enough structure so that the combined polytope described in
LPmin−polymatroid(u) remains integral.
1The intersection of two polymatroid base polytopes, however, need not be a polymatroid.
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Proof. We first lift all integral base polyhedra Bfi ⊂ Zm to the higher dimensional space B¯fi ⊂ Zn·m by
introducing n copies Ei, i ∈N of the elements E leading to E¯ := ∪˙i∈NEi with Ei = {ei1, . . .eim}, i ∈N .
The domain of the integral polymatroid function fi is extended to E¯ as follows
f¯i(S) := fi(Ei ∩S) for all S ⊂ E¯.
This way f¯i(S) remains an integral polymatroid rank function on the lifted space Zn·m. Note that
for x¯i ∈ B¯fi , we have x¯i ∈ Zn·m and with fi({∅}) = 0, we get x¯ij = 0 for all j ∈ E¯ \ Ei. By this
construction, we get xi ∈ Bfi ⇔ x¯i ∈ B¯fi .
Now we define the Minkowski sum
B¯1 :=
∑
i∈N
B¯fi ⊂ Zn·m,
which is again an integral polymatroid base polyhedron. By this construction we can represent all
collections of integral base vectors by a single integral polymatroid base polyhedron.
It remains to also handle the capacity constraint (8) (note that this is not a box constraint for
polymatroid B¯1). For S ⊂ E¯, we define Sj := {j ∈ E| ∃ i ∈ N with eij ∈ S} as the union of those
original element indices (in E) for which S contains at least one copy. With this definition, we define
a second polymatroid as follows.
B¯2 := {x ∈ Zn·m| x(S)≤ h(S) for all S ⊆ E¯, x(E¯) = h(E¯)},
where for S ⊂ E¯ h(S) := ∑j∈Sj uj . One can easily verify that h is an integral polymatroid function.
Now observe that for the sets {ej1, . . . ,ejn}, j ∈ E we exactly get the capacity constraint x
(
{ej1, . . . ,ejn}
)
≤
uj , j ∈ E. Altogether, with the minimality of u, problem ILPmin−polymatroid(u) can be reduced to the
problem of finding a vector in the intersection of B¯1 and B¯2 minimizing a linear objective:
min
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈E
pii,j(u)xij
∣∣∣∣∣∣ x ∈ B¯1 ∩ B¯2
 (9)
By the fundamental result of Edmonds [28, Thm. (35)], the fractional relaxation E¯B1∩E¯B2 is integral.
Note that there are strongly polynomial time algorithms computing an optimal solution to (9) (see
Cunningham and Frank [22] and Frank and Tardos [35]).
We remark that Borndörfer [14] proved a similar result for the special case of matroids and unit
integral capacity vectors u.
3.4 Utility Maximization on Polymatroids
For the maximization variant, the strategy spaces Xi, i ∈ N are usually defined as the vectors of an
integral polymatroid polyhedron Pfi . We get the following reformulation of ILPmax(u):
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max
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈E
vi,j(u)xij (ILPmax−polymatroid(u))
xi ∈ Pfi for all i ∈N
`j(x)≤ uj , j ∈ E
The following companion result for maximization problems on polymatroids holds true.
Theorem 3.9. Assume that vi,j ≥ 0, i ∈ N,j ∈ E. Then, for maximization problems on polymatroids,
any supply vector u ∈ Zm+ for which there exists x ∈X with `(x) = u is enforceable.
Proof. With vi,j ≥ 0 it follows that v(x) is monotonically nondecreasing. Moreover, for any integral
u ∈ Zm+ for which there exists x ∈ X with `(x) = u it is known that X is upwards closed – using
polymatroid properties. Thus, with the proof of Theorem 3.8 and Corollary 3.4 the result follows.
4 Applications in Congestion Games
We now demonstrate the applicability of our framework by deriving new existence results of tolls
enforcing certain load vectors in congestion games. Moreover, we show how several known results in
the literature follow directly.
4.1 Nonatomic Congestion Games
We first present results for the case that the strategy spaces of players are convex subsets of Rm+ . We
are given a directed graph G= (V,E) and a set of populations N := {1, . . . ,n}, where each population
i ∈N has a demand di > 0 that has to be routed from a source si ∈ V to a destination ti ∈ V . In the
nonatomic model, the demand interval [0,di] represents a continuum of infinitesimally small agents
each acting independently choosing a cost minimal si,ti path. There are continuous cost functions
ci,j : Rm+ → R+, i ∈ N,j ∈ E which may depend on the population identity and also on the aggregate
load vector – thus allowing for modeling non-separable latency functions. A flow for population i ∈N
is a nonnegative vector xi ∈ R|E|+ that lives in the flow polytope:
Xi =
xi ∈ Rm+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈δ+(v)
xi,j −
∑
j∈δ−(v)
xi,j = γi(v), for all v ∈ V
 ,
where δ+(v) and δ−(v) are the arcs leaving and entering v, and γi(v) = di, if v = si, γi(v) = −di, if
v = ti, and = 0, otherwise. We assume that every ti is reachable in G from si for all i ∈ N , thus,
Xi , ∅ for all i ∈ N . Given a combined flow x ∈X, the cost of a path P ∈ Pi, where Pi denotes the
set of simple si, ti paths in G, is defined as
ci,P (`(x)) :=
∑
j∈P
ci,j(`(x)).
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A Wardrop equilibrium x with path-decomposition (xi,P )i∈N,P∈Pi is defined as follows:
ci,P (`(x))≤ ci,Q(`(x)) for all P,Q ∈ Pi with xi,P > 0.
The interpretation here is that any agent is traveling along a shortest path given the overall load
vector `(x). One can reformulate the Wardrop equilibrium conditions using load vectors u stating
that - given the load vector of a Wardrop equilibrium - every agent is traveling along a shortest path.
Lemma 4.1 (Dafermos [23, 24]). A strategy distribution x∗ ∈X with overall load vector u := `(x∗) is
a Wardrop equilibrium if and only if
x∗i ∈ argmin
∑
j∈E
ci,j(u)xi,j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ xi ∈Xi
 for all i ∈N.
With this characterization, the model fits in our framework and we can apply our general existence
result.
Theorem 4.2 (Yang and Huang [78], Fleischer et al. [31], Karakostas and Kolliopoulos [44]). Every
minimal capacity vector u is enforceable.
Proof. Define pii(u,xi) :=
∑
j∈E ci,j(u)xi,j for every i ∈N . By the linearity of the objective in Pmin(u)
and the fact that Slater’s constraint qualification condition is satisfied, the result follows by Corol-
lary 2.7.
Note that the above result is more general than that of [31, 44, 78] as we allow for arbitrary
player-specific cost functions ci,j , i ∈N,j ∈ E. Previous works assumed less general heterogeneous cost
functions of the form
ci,P (x) =
∑
j∈P
αicj(`j(x)) +λj ,
where αi > 0 represents a tradeoff parameter weighting the impact of money versus travel time.
Fleischer et al. [31, Sec. 6] also mention that their existence result holds for the more general case of
non-separable latency functions.
4.2 Atomic Congestion Games
Now we turn to atomic congestion games as introduced in Rosenthal [62]. This setting arises by
assuming that di = 1 for all i ∈N and requiring that all strategy vectors xi need to be integral, that
is, xi ∈ {0,1}m. As is standard in the congestion games literature, instead of considering network
games, where the strategies are paths in graphs, we can associated a set Si ⊂ 2m of allowable subsets
of E with every i ∈N and the incidence vectors of a set S ∈ Si represent a feasible xi and vice versa.
We use in the following the more general model of so-called polytopal congestion games introduced by
Del Pia et al. [61] and further studied by Kleer and Schäfer [48]. In this model, the strategy spaces
are defined as
Xi := Pi ∩{0,1}m, i ∈N,
where Pi are polyhedrons of the form Pi = {xi ∈ Rm+ |Axi ≥ bi} for some rational matrix A and
integral vector bi of appropriate dimension. We remark here that all characterizations regarding
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box-TDI and IPD also work for systems Axi = bi or Axi ≤ bi assuming that A and bi carry the
desired structure (see for instance Kleer and Schäfer [48, Prop. 2.1]). In the following, we differentiate
between homogeneous cost functions of the form cj(`j(x)), j ∈ E and player-specific cost functions
ci,j(`j(x)), j ∈ E,i ∈N .
Homogeneous Cost Functions. Given a strategy distribution x ∈X, the cost functions of the players
i ∈N are defined as
pii(`(x),xi) =
∑
j∈E
cj(`j(x)) ·xi,j , (10)
where cj : Z+→ Z represents the cost on resource j given the load `j(x). This formulation corresponds
to the classical formulation of Rosenthal if the set of incidence vectors xi in Xi correspond to a set
system Si ⊆ 2E of allowable subsets of resources. Let us formally state the definition of a Nash
equilibrium w.r.t. prices λ ∈ Rm+ .
Definition 4.3. A strategy distribution x ∈ X with overall load vector `(x) is a Nash equilibrium of
the strategic game on (N,X,pi) with cost functions pi as in (10) and prices λ ∈ Rm+ :⇔
pii(`(x),xi) +λᵀxi ≤ pii(`((x−i,yi)),yi) +λᵀyi for all yi ∈Xi for all i ∈N ,
where (x−i,yi) := (x1, . . . ,xi−1,yi,xi+1, . . . ,xn).
For applying Theorem 3.7, we need a few more insights. The cost function of player i has the
form pii(`(x),xi) and depends on `(x). However, we can state the following sufficient condition on the
existence of Nash equilibria x ∈X with u = `(x).
Lemma 4.4. Assume that cost functions cj , j ∈ E are nondecreasing. A strategy distribution x∗ ∈ X
with overall load vector u := `(x∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the strategic game (N,X,pi) with cost
functions as in (10) and prices λ ∈ Rm+ , if
x∗i ∈ argmin
∑
j∈E
cj(uj)xi,j +λᵀxi
∣∣∣∣∣∣ xi ∈Xi
 for all i ∈N. (11)
Proof. Let i ∈N and yi ∈Xi. For yi denote E(yi) := {j ∈ E|yij = 1} the support of yi. We calculate
pii(`(x∗),x∗i ) +λᵀx∗i =
∑
j∈E(x∗i )
(cj(uj) +λj)x∗i,j
≤
∑
j∈E(yi)
(cj(uj) +λj)yi,j (12)
≤
∑
j∈E(yi)\E(x∗i )
(cj(uj + 1) +λj)yi,j +
∑
j∈E(yi)∩E(x∗i )
(cj(uj) +λj)yi,j (13)
= pii(`((x∗−i,yi)),yi) +λᵀyi,
where (12) follows from the optimality of x∗i for problem (11) and (13) follows from the monotonicity
of the cost functions cj , j ∈ E.
21
Clearly the condition (11) is only sufficient for enforcing u and not necessary. Fotakis and Spi-
rakis [34] termed prices λ that induce equilibria x with the property stated in (11) cost-balancing.
Now we can use Theorem 3.7 to state the following result.
Theorem 4.5. Let (N,X,pi) be a congestion game with homogeneous nondecreasing cost functions and
polytopal strategy spaces with aggregation polyhedron PN . Let u be minimal for X. If PN is box-TDI
and satisfies IDP, u is enforceable. In particular, box-integrality and IDP holds for:
1. Network games with a common source and multiple sinks,
2. r-arborescence congestion games (see Harks et al. [40] and Kleer and Schäfer [48] for a definition)
3. Intersection of strongly base-orderable matroids (see Kleer and Schäfer [48] for a definition)
4. symmetric totally-unimodular games (see Del Pia et al. [61] for a definition) including matching
games,
5. Asymmetric matroid games (see Ackermann et al. [1]).
Proof. By Lemma 4.4, it suffices that for every player i ∈ N , condition (11) is satisfied. With this
condition, the result follows by Theorem 3.7.
Note that by box-integrality and IDP of PN , any u ∈ Zm+ that minimizes a strictly component-wise
monotonically increasing function is enforceable. In particular, for monotonically increasing functions
cj(`(x)), j ∈ E, a vector u ∈ Zm+ corresponding to a minimum cost solution, that is, u = `(x∗) for some
x∗ ∈ argmin
∑
j∈N
cj(`(x))`(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣x ∈X

is enforceable. The congestion vector u minimizing the (weakly convex) social cost can be computed
in polynomial time (see Del Pia et al. [61] and Kleer and Schäfer [48]) and additionally the space of
enforcing prices can be described by a compact linear formulation. This allows for optimizing arbitrary
linear objective functions (like maximum or minimum revenue) over the price/allocation space. To the
best of our knowledge, the only previous results for the existence of (optimal) tolls are due to Marden
et al. [52], Fotakis and Spirakis [34] and Fotakis et al. [33]. Marden et al. [52] proved that marginal
cost tolls enforce the minimum cost solution by charing the difference between the social cost and the
cost of Rosenthals’ potential. With this approach, there is no control on the magnitude of price and no
structure for optimizing secondary objectives over prices. In addition, for other (non-optimal) vectors
u, this approach does not work. Fotakis and Spirakis [34] proved that any acyclic integral flow in an
s,t digraph can be enforced. It is not hard to see that the notion of minimality of u for X exactly
corresponds to the set of acyclic integral s,t flows. Fotakis et al. [33] generalized this result to single
source multi-sink network games allowing even for heterogeneous players.
Congestion Games with Player-Specific Cost Functions. Now we turn to the general model of
player-specific non-decreasing separable cost functions cij(`j(x)), i ∈ N,j ∈ E and consider the case
of integral polymatroid congestion games, see Harks et al. [42]. In this model, for every i ∈ N , the
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strategy space Xi is the integral base polyhedron Bfi of a polymatroid Pfi . If we assume that vectors
in Bfi are {0,1}, that is, Bfi ⊂ {0,1}m, i ∈N , a straight-forward adaption of Lemma 4.4 together with
Theorem 3.8 implies the following result.
Theorem 4.6. Consider an integral polymatroid congestion game with Xi = Bfi ⊂ {0,1}m, i ∈ N and
nondecreasing player-specific separable cost functions. Let u ∈ Zm be minimal for X. Then, u is
enforceable.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first existence result of enforceable tolls in congestion games
with player-specific cost functions. One might be tempted to think that - as in Theorem 4.5 - one
can use the aggregation polytope PN and also show integrality of optimal solutions to LPmin(u) for
natural classes such as s,t network games with player-specific cost functions. Note that this approach
does not work, because the objective function depends on the player’s identities on the elements and
not on an aggregate. The following result shows that, unless P = NP , even for s,t network games
with homogeneous cost functions but heterogeneous players, LPmin(u) is not integral in general.
Theorem 4.7. Unless P = NP , problem LPmin(u) does not admit integral optimal solutions for all
symmetric s,t network congestion games with heterogeneous players and separable and nondecreasing
homogeneous cost functions.
Proof. Consider an instance of the directed disjoint path problem, where we are given a directed
graph G = (V,E) and 2 source-sink pairs (si, ti), i = 1, . . . ,2. The task is to decide whether there are
2 arc disjoint si,ti paths Pi, i = 1,2. This problem is strongly NP-hard (see Fortune et al. [32]). We
transform this problem to an instance of ILPmin(u) as follows. We introduce a super source s and a
super sink t and connect s via a directed arc to every source si, i= 1,2 and every ti, i= 1,2 to t. The
nondecreasing and separable costs for the new arcs are defined as
c(s,s1)(`(s,s1)(x)) = 1, c(s,s2)(`(s,s2)(x)) = 0
c(t1,t)(`(t1,t)(x)) = 1, c(t2,t)(`(t2,t)(x)) = 0
All other costs cj , j ∈ E of the original edges are defined as follows, where C > 0 is a large number.
cj(`j(x)) =
{
0, if `j(x)≤ 1
C, if `j(x)≥ 2.
The cost functions cj , j ∈ E ∪ {(s,si)i∈N ,(ti, t)i∈N} are nondecreasing and homogeneous. We define
α1 = 1 and α2 = C. This way, we make sure that, if there are two disjoint paths connecting the si,ti,
then, the lower sensitivity of player 1 with respect to the congestion cost ensures that player 1 also
uses the correct (s,s1) and (t1, t) arc. For the capacity vector u = (2, . . . ,2) we get that there are 2
directed disjoint si,ti paths in G if and only if ILPmin(u) has an optimal solution of value less than 2.
Thus, the relaxation LPmin(u) of ILPmin(u) cannot be integral, because, otherwise, we could decide
the 2-directed disjoint path problem in polynomial time.
We remark that the above reduction does not rely on the hardness of checking whether or not the
integral space X ∩ {`(x) ≤ u} is non-empty since with u = 2, we can always find an integral s,t flow
of value 2.
23
5 Application to Market Equilibria
We now consider market games and first present a classical model of Walrasian market equilibria with
indivisible items. Then, we study a class of valuations for multi-item settings that allows for some
degree of externalities of allocations.
5.1 General Valuations without Externalities
We are given a finite set E = {1, . . . ,m} of items and there is a finite set of players N = {1, . . . ,n}
interested in buying some of the items. For every subset S ⊆ E of items, player i derives value
wi(S) ∈ R giving rise to a valuation function wi : 2m → R, i ∈ N, where 2m represents the set of all
subsets of E. The seller wants to determine a price vector λ ∈ Rm+ so that all items are sold to the
players and every player i ∈N gets a subset Si of items that are maximizers of her quasi-linear utility,
that is, Si ∈ argmaxS⊆E{wi(S)−
∑
j∈S λj}. Such an allocation is known as a competitive Walrasian
equilibrium. A natural condition on valuations is normalization and monotonicity as stated below.
1. wi(∅) = 0 for all i ∈N.
2. wi(S)≤ wi(T ) for any S ⊆ T ⊆ E and all i ∈N.
A fundamental property of valuations wi, i ∈ N is the so-called gross-substitutes condition defined
below. Denote by Di(λ) = argmaxS⊆E{wi(S)−
∑
j∈S λj} the set of maximizers for i ∈N given price
vector λ.
Definition 5.1. A valuation wi defined on E satisfies the gross substitutes (GS) condition if and only if
for every price vector λ, every set S ∈Di(λ), and every other price vector µ≥ λ, there is a set T ⊆ E
with (S \U)∪ T ∈ Di(µ), where U := {j ∈ E : µj > λj} is the of items whose prices have increased
under µ compared to λ.
The condition requires that whenever the prices of some items increase and the prices of other items
remain constant, the agent’s demand for the items whose price remain constant only increases. Let
us recall an existence theorem by Kelso and Crawford [47].
Theorem 5.2 (Kelso and Crawford [47]). For GS valuations, there exists a competitive Walrasian
equilibrium.2
We present now two ways to prove this result: the first proof uses discrete convexity arguments
(cf. Murota [56]) while the second follows standard LP-duality (cf. the monograph by Vohra [74] or
the survey by Paes Leme [50]). Both proofs are well known in the literature, however, the aim is to
show that both proofs fit into the unifying duality framework of this paper. In the subsequent section,
we present an existence result for a class of multi-unit market games.
2Gul and Stachetti [39] even showed that in some sense GS is the maximal condition on valuations for which equilibria
exist.
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Proof based on Strong Duality in Discrete Convexity. In the first way, we can use Theorem 2.8 by
showing that problem Pmax(u) has zero duality gap for the supply vector u = (1, . . . ,1)ᵀ ∈ Rm. One
can show this property by using insights from discrete convexity and the special form ofM \ functions,
see Murota [56, Sec. 11.3] for a definition and an exhaustive overview of the topic.
We formulate problem Pmax(u) directly using incidence vectors xi ∈ {0,1}m on the set E together
with a constraint ensuring that every item is sold to at most one agent. Thus, problem Pmax(u)
becomes
max
∑
i∈N
vi(1,xi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣xi ∈ {0,1}m, i ∈N, `(x)≤ 1
 ,
where vi(1,xi) := wi({j ∈ E|xij = 1}). Let us now recall a characterization of Fujishige and Yang [37].
Theorem 5.3 (Fujishige and Yang [37]). A normalized and monotone valuation function is GS if and
only if it is M \.
It is known that if all vi, i ∈N are M \, so is ∑i∈N vi. Altogether, we obtain a very special discrete
optimization problem with an M \ function over {0,1}n·m involving the special constraint `(x) ≤ 1
which constitues a hierarchy, see Yokote [80] for further details. Yokote [80] proved that such a
problem has zero duality gap. Thus, with the zero duality gap property, the monotonicity of v(x) and
the upward-closed property of X (unsold items can be given to buyers for free yielding only higher
valuation), Theorem 2.8 implies Theorem 5.2. We remark here that Yokote [80, Sec. 4] described in
his paper the connection of his strong duality theorem (in the realm of discrete convexity) with the
existence of market equilibria for GS valuations.
Proof based on Strong Duality of Lifted LPs. A second (well-known) proof is based on linear
programming duality and integrality of optimal solutions, see Nisan et al. [58, Chapter 11]. We present
it here as a special case of Corollary 3.4 using a lifted formulation as described in Section 2.3. Let us
introduce the lifting variable yi,S ∈ {0,1}, i ∈ N,S ⊆ E with the understanding that yi,S = 1 means
that player i receives the set of items S. Then, we can describe the valuation function vi(1,xi,yi) and
the space Xi as:
vi(1,xi,yi) =
∑
S⊆E
wi(S)yi,S , (14)
together with
Xi =
(xi,yi) ∈ {0,1}m+2m
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
S⊆E
yi,S ≤ 1, yi,S ≤ xi,j for all j ∈ S,S ⊆ E
 .
Note that the first constraint ∑S⊆E yi,S ≤ 1 ensures that player i gets at most a single set of items,
while the second inequality yi,S ≤ xi,j for all j ∈ S,S ⊆ E ensures that whenever yi,S = 1, then also
xi,j = 1 for all j ∈ S. Prescribing a supply vector u = (1, . . . ,1)ᵀ ∈ Rm, ensures that we have exactly
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one unit of every item and the inequality `(x) ≤ 1, ensures that we sell only the available items. In
order to apply the previous results, we need to check whether
max
v(x,y) = ∑
i∈N
vi(1,xi,yi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣(x,y) ∈ R(X), `(x)≤ 1

has zero duality gap and admits an integral optimal solution, where R(X) denotes the standard frac-
tional LP-relaxation. Since the combined valuation function v(x,y) is monotonically non-decreasing
in (x,y) and X is upward-closed, there always exists an optimal solution satisfying `(x) = 1. As the
objective function vi(1,xi,yi) solely depends on yi, we can eliminate the variable xi and define an
equivalent problem only in the variable yi,S ≥ 0, i ∈N,S ⊆ E:
max
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆E
wi(S)yi,S
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
S⊆E
yi,S ≤ 1,
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆E:j∈S
yi,S ≤ 1, j ∈ E, yi,S ≥ 0, i ∈N,S ⊆ E
 .
For the above problem, Bikchandani and Mamer [12] (see also Shapley and Shubik [66]) have shown
that there is an integral optimal solution with zero duality gap – and that this condition is even
necessary for the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
5.2 Item Multiplicity, Additive Valuations with Externalities and Polymatroids
Now we turn to a multi-item model that allows for several items of the same type and some degree of
externalities of allocations. There is a finite set E = {1, . . . ,m} of item types and every item may be
available at a certain multiplicity. Assume further that Xi ⊂ {0,1}m, i ∈ N . This implies that every
player wants to receive at most one item per type - however Xi may still carry some combinatorial
restrictions for feasible item sets for player i ∈N . Suppose that valuations of players are additive over
items, that is,
vi(`(x),xi) :=
∑
j∈E
vij(`j(x))xij , (15)
where vij : Z+→ R+ is the nonnegative value player i gets from receiving an item of type j assuming
that item j is sold to `j(x) many players. This formulation is not directly comparable to the one
before. On the one hand side, additivity of valuations over items is less general. On the other hand,
several items of the same type can be sold and we allow for a functional dependency of the valuations
with respect to the load `j(x). Such dependency may be interesting for situations, where the value
vij(·) of receiving item type j drops as other players also receive the same type – in economics this is
usually referred to as a setting with negative externalities.
Assumption 5.4. For every i ∈N,j ∈ E, the functions vij are nonnegative and exhibit negative exter-
nalities, that is, vij(z)≥ vij(z+ 1) for all z ∈ Z+.
The model so far does not satisfy the assumption of a maximization game Gmax(u) augmented with
prices, as the utility of a player is allowed to depend on the load vector `(x). In the following lemma,
however, we state a sufficient condition under which a load vector u can be enforced for the game
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in which utilities depend on the load vector. This condition can be used to study a game of type
Gmax(u) augmented with prices.
Lemma 5.5. A strategy distribution x∗ with u = `(x∗) is a market equilibrium for prices λ ∈ Rm+ , if
x∗i ∈ argmax
∑
j∈E
vij(uj)xi,j −λᵀxi
∣∣∣∣∣∣ xi ∈Xi
 for all i ∈N. (16)
Proof. We get the following series of inequalities for any other strategy yi ∈Xi ⊆ {0,1}m:
vi(`(x∗),x∗i ) =
∑
j∈E(x∗i )
(vij(uj)−λj)x∗i,j
≥
∑
j∈E(yi)
(vij(uj)−λj)yi,j (17)
≥
∑
j∈E(yi)\E(x∗i )
(vij(uj + 1)−λj)yi,j +
∑
j∈E(yi)∩E(x∗i )
(vij(uj)−λj)yi,j (18)
= vi(`((x∗−i,yi)),yi)−λᵀyi,
where (17) follows by the optimality of x∗i for the maximization problem (16) and (18) follows by
Assumption 5.4.
With this insight, we get the following result using Theorem 3.9.
Theorem 5.6. Let Xi = Pfi ⊂ {0,1}m, i ∈N be integral polymatroid polyhedra and assume that valua-
tion functions satisfy Assumption 5.4. Then, any supply vector u ∈ Zm+ for which there is x ∈X with
`(x) = u is enforceable.
Proof. With Lemma 5.5 and the non-negativity of the vij , the result follows from Theorem 3.9.
5.3 Homogeneous Valuations and Polytopal Strategy Spaces
Now we discuss the special case of homogeneous separable additive valuations, that is,
vi(`(x),xi) :=
∑
j∈E
vj(`j(x))xij , (19)
where vj : Z+→ R+ is a nonnegative and nonincreasing valuation function. Similar as in Section 4.2,
if we assume that Xi = {xi ∈ {0,1}m|Axi ≤ bi} for some rational matrix A and integral bi, we can
study the aggregation polytope PN and identify problem classes for which PN is box-TDI and has the
IDP. This way, we can obtain similar results as those in Theorem 4.5. Interesting applications arise
in the context of network settings, where players are interested in buying paths in a graph.
Theorem 5.7. Let Xi, i ∈N be polyhedral (as described above) and assume that valuation functions are
of the form (19). Let u ∈ Zm+ so that there exists x ∈ X with `(x) = u. If the corresponding PN is
box-TDI and satisfies IDP, u is enforceable. In particular, box-TDI and IDP holds for:
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1. Network games with a common source and multiple sinks,
2. r-arborescence games,
3. Intersection of strongly base-orderable matroids,
4. symmetric totally-unimodular games including matching games.
It also follows that one can enforce a socially optimal supply vector u, that is
u = `(x∗) for some x∗ ∈ argmax
∑
j∈E
vj(`j(x))`j(x)|x ∈X
 .
This vector u can also be computed in polynomial time, because with the monotonicity of vj , j ∈ E, the
objective function is discrete concave, leading to a tractable integer program (see Del Pia et al. [61] and
Kleer and Schäfer [48]). Also the compact representation of enforcing prices/allocations as described
in Section 4.2 carries over.
6 Application to Congestion Control in Communication Networks
In the domain of network-based TCP congestion control, we are given a directed or undirected capac-
itated graph G= (V,E,u), where V are the nodes, E with |E|=m is the edge set and u ∈ Rm+ denote
the edge capacities. There is a set of players N = {1, . . . ,n} and every i ∈ N is associated with an
end-to-end pair (si, ti) ∈ V ×V and a bandwidth utility function Ui : R+→ R+ measuring the received
benefit from sending net flow from si to ti. As in congestion games, a flow for i ∈N is a nonnegative
vector xi ∈ R|E|+ that lives in the flow polyhedron:
Xi =
xi ∈ Rm+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈δ+(v)
xi,j −
∑
j∈δ−(v)
xi,j = 0, for all v ∈ V \ {si, ti}
 ,
where δ+(v) and δ−(v) are the arcs leaving and entering v. We assume Xi , ∅ for all i ∈ N and we
denote the net flow reaching t by val(xi) :=
∑
j∈δ+(si)xi,j −
∑
j∈δ−(si)xi,j , i ∈ N . The goal in price-
based congestion control is to determine edge prices λj , j ∈ E so that a strategy distribution x∗ is
induced as an equilibrium respecting the network capacities u and, hence, avoiding congestion. The
equilibrium condition amounts to
x∗i ∈ argmax{Ui(val(xi))−λᵀxi|xi ∈Xi} for all i ∈N .
We obtain the following result for concave bandwidth utility functions.
Theorem 6.1 (Kelly et al. [45]). For concave bandwidth utility functions Ui, i ∈N , every capacity vector
u ∈ Rm+ is weakly enforceable.
Proof. With the concavity of Ui, i ∈ N , problem Pmax(u) is a convex optimization problem over
a polytope and hence satisfies Slater’s constraint qualification conditions for strong duality. Thus,
Theorem 2.8 implies the result.
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Let us turn to models where the flow polyeder Xi is intersected with Zm+ . Most of the previous
works in the area of congestion control assume either that there is only a single path per (si, ti) pair
or as in Kelly et al. [45], the flow is allowed to be fractional. Allowing a fully fractional distribution
of the flow, however, is not possible in some interesting applications - the notion of data packets as
indivisible units seems more realistic. The issue of completely fractional routing versus integrality
requirements has been explicitly addressed by Orda et al. [59], Harks and Klimm [41] and Wang et
al. [76]. Using the TDI and IDP property of network matrices, we obtain the following result for
integral flow polytopes.
Theorem 6.2. Let the bandwidth utility functions Ui, i ∈N be non-decreasing, identical and linear and
assume that all players share the same source si = s, i ∈ N . Then, for integral routing models with
strategy spaces X ′i =Xi ∩Zm+ , every capacity vector u ∈ Zm+ is weakly enforceable.
Proof. We can write X ′i = {xi ∈ Zm+ |Axi = bi} for all i ∈ N , where A is the graph incidence matrix
of G and bij = 0 for all j ∈ V \ {si, ti} while for si,ti there are no constraints. Then, we can use
the aggregation polytope PN as in Section 4.2, equation (7). The assumption on bandwidth utility
functions implies the form Ui(z) = az,a≥ 0, i ∈N . Thus, the aggregated utility can be written as
∑
i∈N
val(xi) =
∑
i∈N
a
 ∑
j∈δ+(s)
xi,j −
∑
j∈δ−(s)
xi,j
= a
 ∑
j∈δ+(s)
yj −
∑
j∈δ−(s)
yj
 .
Then, LPmax(u) can be reformulated as
max
a
 ∑
j∈δ+(s)
yj −
∑
j∈δ−(s)
yj
 ∣∣∣∣∣∣ y ∈ PN ∩{y|y≤ u}

As the objective is linear and PN is box-TDI, this LP admits an integral optimal solution. By the
IDP property of PN , we can decompose an integral optimal solution and the result follows. One can
also interpret LPmax(u) as a max-flow problem on a slightly changed instance, where we introduce a
super-sink and connect all ti’s to the sink with large enough capacity. This way, we obtain a standard
max-flow problem which is known to admit integral optimal solutions.
Remark 6.3. The above proof shows that for a capacity vector u ∈ Zm+ , we can compactly represent
the enforcing prices/allocation space and efficiently optimize linear functions over it.
7 Conclusions and Extensions
We introduced a generic resource allocation problem and studied the question of enforceability of cer-
tain load vectors u via (anonymous) pricing of resources. We derived a characterization of enforceable
load vectors via studying the duality gap of an associated optimization problem. Using this general
result, we studied consequences of known structural results in the area of linear integer optimization,
polyhedral combinatorics and discrete convexity for several application cases.
Understanding duality gaps of optimization problems is an active research area, see for instance
the progress on duality for nonlinear mixed integer programming (cf. Baes et al. [5]). Thus, our
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general characterization yields the opportunity to translate progress in this field to economic situations
mentioned in the applications.
A further consequence of the proposed framework is the enforceability of load vectors u using mixed
or correlated equilibria. For these equilibrium concepts, the strategy space of a finite strategic game
is a (convex) polytope and if the cost/utility function of the extended game (e.g., the cost/utility
function of the mixed extension) is convex in the randomization variable, we have strong duality of
the master problem Pmin(u) and enforceability results for expected load vectors follow.
For our general model we assumed that the strategy spaces are subsets Xi ∈ Rm, i ∈ N . This
assumption is not necessary for proving our main result. We could have chosen Xi as a Banach space
and the results would have gone through. In fact, in the area of dynamic traffic assignments (cf.
Friesz et al [36]), the flow trajectories live in function spaces, thus, offering the possibility that our
characterization on Banach spaces yields the existence of (time varying) tolls for these applications
too.
Acknowledgements
I thank Dimitris Fotakis, Martin Hoefer, Max Klimm and Anja Schedel for helpful discussions on an
earlier draft of this manuscript. I am also grateful for the comments received by attendees of the
workshop “20 years of price of anarchy” held in Crete, Juli 2019.
References
[1] H. Ackermann, H. Röglin, and B. Vöcking. On the impact of combinatorial structure on congestion
games. J. ACM, 55(6):1–22, 2008.
[2] K. J. Arrow. An extension of the basic theorems of classical welfare economics. In Proceedings
of the Second Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability, pages 507–532,
Berkeley, Calif., 1951. University of California Press.
[3] L. M. Ausubel. An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities. American Eco-
nomic Review, 96(3):602–629, 2006.
[4] L. M. Ausubel and P. R. Milgrom. Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding. The B.E. Journal
of Theoretical Economics, 1(1):1–44, 2002.
[5] M. Baes, T. Oertel, and R. Weismantel. Duality for mixed-integer convex minimization. Math.
Program., 158(1-2):547–564, 2016.
[6] E. Baldwin and P. Klemperer. Understanding preferences: “Demand Types”, and the existence
of equilibrium with indivisibilities. Econometrica, 87(3):867–932, 2019.
[7] M. Beckmann, C. McGuire, and C. Winsten. Studies in the Economics and Transportation. Yale
University Press, New Haven, CT, USA, 1956.
[8] P. Bergendorff, D. Hearn, and M. Ramana. Congestion toll pricing of traffic networks. In P. Parda-
los, D. Hearn, and W. Hager, editors, Network Optimization, volume 450 of Lecture Notes in
Economics and Mathematical Systems, pages 51–71, 1997.
30
[9] D. Bertsekas and R. Gallagher. Data Networks. Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA,
2nd edition, 1992.
[10] S. Bhattacharya, J. Kulkarni, K. Munagala, and X. Xu. On allocations with negative externali-
ties. In Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Singapore,
December 11-14, 2011. Proceedings, pages 25–36, 2011.
[11] S. Bikhchandani, S. de Vries, J. Schummer, and R. V. Vohra. An ascending Vickrey auction for
selling bases of a matroid. Operations Research, 59(2):400–413, 2011.
[12] S. Bikhchandani and J. W. Mamer. Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with
indivisibilities. J. Econom. Theory, 74(2):385 – 413, 1997.
[13] V. Bonifaci, M. Salek, and G. Schäfer. Efficiency of restricted tolls in non-atomic network routing
games. In G. Persiano, editor, Algorithmic Game Theory, volume 6982 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 302–313. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011.
[14] R. Borndörfer. Combinatorial packing problems. In M. Grötschel, editor, The Sharpest Cut –
The Impact of Manfred Padberg and His Work, pages 19–32, Philadelphia, 2004. SIAM.
[15] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe. Convex Optimization. Cambridge University Press, New York,
NY, USA, 2004.
[16] O. Candogan, K. Bimpikis, and A. Ozdaglar. Optimal pricing in networks with externalities.
Operations Research, 60(4):883–905, 2012.
[17] O. Candogan, A. Ozdaglar, and P. Parrilo. Pricing equilibria and graphical valuations. ACM
Trans. Econ. Comput., 6(1):2:1–2:26, Feb. 2018.
[18] O. Candogan and S. Pekec. Efficient allocation and pricing of multifeatured items. Management
Science, 64(12):5521–5543, 2018.
[19] I. Caragiannis, C. Kaklamanis, and P. Kanellopoulos. Taxes for linear atomic congestion games.
ACM Trans. Algorithms, 7(1):13:1–13:31, 2010.
[20] R. Cole, Y. Dodis, and T. Roughgarden. Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users.
In Proc. 35th Annual ACM Sympos. Theory Comput., pages 521–530, 2003.
[21] R. Cominetti and C. Guzmán. Network congestion control with markovian multipath routing.
Math. Program., 147(1-2):231–251, Oct. 2014.
[22] W. H. Cunningham and A. Frank. A primal-dual algorithm for submodular flows. Math. Oper.
Res., 10(2):251–262, 1985.
[23] S. Dafermos. Traffic equilibrium and variational inequalities. Transportation Sci., 14(1):42–54,
1980.
[24] S. C. Dafermos. An Extended Traffic Assignment Model with Applications to Two-Way Traffic.
Transportation Science, 5(4):366–389, November 1971.
31
[25] V. Danilov, G. Koshevoy, and K. Murota. Discrete convexity and equilibria in economies with
indivisible goods and money. Mathematical Social Sciences, 41(3):251 – 273, 2001.
[26] G. Debreu. The coefficient of resource utilization. Econometrica, 19(3):273–292, 1951.
[27] R. B. Dial. Minimal-revenue congestion pricing part I: A fast algorithm for the single-origin case.
Transportation Res., 33(B):189–202, 1999.
[28] J. Edmonds. Submodular Functions, Matroids, and Certain Polyhedra, pages 11–26. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2003.
[29] J. Edmonds and R. Giles. A min-max relation for submodular functions on graphs. In P. Hammer,
E. Johnson, B. Korte, and G. Nemhauser, editors, Studies in Integer Programming, volume 1 of
Annals of Discrete Mathematics, pages 185 – 204. Elsevier, 1977.
[30] M. Feldman, N. Gravin, and B. Lucier. Combinatorial Walrasian equilibrium. SIAM J. Comput.,
45(1):29–48, 2016.
[31] L. Fleischer, K. Jain, and M. Mahdian. Tolls for heterogeneous selfish users in multicommodity
networks and generalized congestion games. In Proc. 45th Annual IEEE Sympos. Foundations
Comput. Sci., pages 277–285, 2004.
[32] S. Fortune, J. Hopcroft, and J. Wyllie. The directed subgraph homeomorphism problem. Theoret.
Comput. Sci., 10:111–121, 1980.
[33] D. Fotakis, G. Karakostas, and S. G. Kolliopoulos. On the existence of optimal taxes for network
congestion games with heterogeneous users. In Algorithmic Game Theory - Third International
Symposium, SAGT 2010, Athens, Greece, October 18-20, 2010. Proceedings, pages 162–173, 2010.
[34] D. Fotakis and P. G. Spirakis. Cost-balancing tolls for atomic network congestion games. Internet
Mathematics, 5(4):343–363, 2008.
[35] A. Frank and É. Tardos. An application of simultaneous diophantine approximation in combina-
torial optimization. Combinatorica, 7(1):49–65, 1987.
[36] T. L. Friesz, D. Bernstein, T. E. Smith, R. L. Tobin, and B. W. Wie. A variational inequality
formulation of the dynamic network user equilibrium problem. Oper. Res., 41(1):179–191, Jan.
1993.
[37] S. Fujishige and Z. Yang. A note on Kelso and Crawford’s gross substitutes condition. Math.
Oper. Res., 28(3):463–469, 2003.
[38] G. Goel, V. Mirrokni, and R. P. Leme. Polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope.
J. ACM, 62(3):18:1–18:27, June 2015.
[39] F. Gul and E. Stacchetti. Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes. Journal of Economic
Theory, 87(1):95–124, 1999.
32
[40] T. Harks, M. Hoefer, M. Klimm, and A. Skopalik. Computing pure Nash and strong equilibria
in bottleneck congestion games. Math. Program., Ser. A, 141:193–215, 2013.
[41] T. Harks and M. Klimm. Congestion games with variable demands. Math. Oper. Res., 41(1):255–
277, 2016.
[42] T. Harks, M. Klimm, and B. Peis. Sensitivity analysis for convex separable optimization over
integral polymatroids. SIAM Journal on Optimization, 28(3):2222–2245, 2018.
[43] D. Hearn and M. Ramana. Solving congestion toll pricing models. In P. Marcotte and S. Nguyen,
editors, Equilibrium and Advanced Transportation Modeling, pages 109–124, Dordrecht, Nether-
lands, 1998. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[44] G. Karakostas and S. Kolliopoulos. Edge pricing of multicommodity networks for heterogeneous
selfish users. In Proc. 45th Annual IEEE Sympos. Foundations Comput. Sci., pages 268–276,
2004.
[45] F. Kelly, A. Maulloo, and D. Tan. Rate control in communication networks: Shadow prices,
proportional fairness, and stability. J. Oper. Res. Soc., 49:237–252, 1998.
[46] F. P. Kelly and V. V. Vazirani. Rate control as a market equilibrium. Unpublished manuscript,
2002.
[47] A. S. Kelso and V. Crawford. Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes. Econo-
metrica, 50(6):1483–1504, 1982.
[48] P. Kleer and G. Schäfer. Potential function minimizers of combinatorial congestion games: Effi-
ciency and computation. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Com-
putation, EC ’17, Cambridge, MA, USA, June 26-30, 2017, pages 223–240, 2017.
[49] F. Knight. Some fallacies in the interpretation of social cost. Quart. J. Econ., 38(4):582–606,
1924.
[50] R. P. Leme. Gross substitutability: An algorithmic survey. Games and Economic Behavior,
106:294 – 316, 2017.
[51] J. K. MacKie-Mason and H. R. Varian. Pricing congestible network resources. IEEE J.Sel. A.
Commun., 13(7):1141–1149, Sept. 2006.
[52] J. R. Marden, G. Arslan, and J. S. Shamma. Joint strategy fictitious play with inertia for potential
games. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 54(2):208–220, 2009.
[53] A. Mas-Colell, M. Whinston, and J. Green. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, UK, 1995.
[54] P. Milgrom and B. Strulovici. Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium. Journal of Economic
Theory, 144(1):212 – 247, 2009.
33
[55] H. Moulin. The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing. Econom. Theory,
36(3):379–405, 2008.
[56] K. Murota. Discrete Convex Analysis: Monographs on Discrete Mathematics and Applications
10. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, Philadelphia, PA, USA, 2003.
[57] K. Murota and A. Tamura. New characterizations of M-convex functions and their applications to
economic equilibrium models with indivisibilities. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 131(2):495–512,
2003.
[58] N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, and V. Vazirani. Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2007.
[59] A. Orda, R. Rom, and N. Shimkin. Competitive routing in multi-user communication networks.
IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking, 1:510–521, 1993.
[60] D. P. Palomar and M. Chiang. A tutorial on decomposition methods for network utility maxi-
mization. IEEE J.Sel. A. Commun., 24(8):1439–1451, Aug. 2006.
[61] A. D. Pia, M. Ferris, and C. Michini. Totally unimodular congestion games. In Proceedings of the
Twenty-Eighth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2017, Barcelona,
Spain, Hotel Porta Fira, January 16-19, pages 577–588, 2017.
[62] R. Rosenthal. A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Internat. J. Game
Theory, 2:65–67, 1973.
[63] T. Roughgarden. Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA,
2005.
[64] T. Roughgarden and I. Talgam-Cohen. Why prices need algorithms. In Proceedings of the Six-
teenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC ’15, pages 19–36, New York, NY,
USA, 2015. ACM.
[65] A. Schrijver. Combinatorial optimization: polyhedra and efficiency, volume 24. Springer, 2003.
[66] L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik. The assignment game i: The core. International Journal of Game
Theory, 1(1):111–130, 1971.
[67] A. Shioura and A. Tamura. Gross substitutes condition and discrete concavity for multi-unit
valuations: A survey. Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan, 58(1):61–103, 2015.
[68] M. Slater. Lagrange multipliers revisited. Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 80, Cowles
Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, 1959.
[69] M. Smith. The marginal cost taxation of a transportation network. Transportation Res.,
13(B):237–242, 1979.
[70] R. Srikant. The Mathematics of Internet Congestion Control. Birkhäuser, Basel, Switzerland,
2003.
34
[71] N. Sun and Z. Yang. A double-track adjustment process for discrete markets with substitutes
and complements. Econometrica, 77(3):933–952, 2009.
[72] C. Swamy. The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games. In
Proc. 18th Annual ACM-SIAM Sympos. on Discrete Algorithms, pages 1133–1142, 2007.
[73] N. M. Tran and J. Yu. Product-Mix Auctions and Tropical Geometry. Papers, arXiv.org, May
2015.
[74] R. V. Vohra. Mechanism Design: A Linear Programming Approach. Econometric Society Mono-
graphs. Cambridge University Press, 2011.
[75] L. Walras. Elements of pure economics, or, The theory of social wealth. London : Published for
the American Economic Association and the Royal Economic Society by Allen and Unwin, 1954.
[76] M. Wang, C. W. Tan, W. Xu, and A. Tang. Cost of not splitting in routing: Characterization
and estimation. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 19(6):1849–1859, 2011.
[77] J. Wardrop. Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research. Proc. Inst. Civil Engineers, 1(Part
II):325–378, 1952.
[78] H. Yang and H.-J. Huang. The multi-class, multi-criteria traffic network equilibrium and systems
optimum problem. Transportation Res., 38(B):1–15, 2004.
[79] H. Yang and X. Zhang. Existence of anonymous link tolls for system optimum on networks with
mixed equilibrium behaviors. Transportation Res., 42(B):99–112, 2008.
[80] K. Yokote. The discrete Kuhn-Tucker theorem and its application to auctions. MPRA – Munich
Personal RePEc Archive, (83811), 2018.
[81] W. R. Zame and M. Noguchi. Competitive markets with externalities. Theoretical Economics,
1(2):143–166, 2006.
[82] X. J. Zheng, X. L. Sun, D. Li, and Y. F. Xu. On zero duality gap in nonconvex quadratic
programming problems. Journal of Global Optimization, 52(2):229–242, 2012.
35
